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Causal Closure Principles and
Emergentism 
E.  J.  LOWE
At one time, it was popular to argue against interactionist dualism
by appeal to the conservation laws of physics, such as the laws of the
conservation of energy and momentum. However, those laws are
not sacrosanct and there need be nothing unscientific about ques-
tioning them—indeed they have been questioned from time to time
by cosmologists and other physicists. Think, for instance, of Bondi
and Gold’s steady-state model of the universe, which postulated the
continuous creation of matter and hence of energy.1 In an y case,
appeal to those laws can at best only be used to attack dualist mod-
els of psychophysical causation which attribute to the non-physical
mind an ability to affect the energy or momentum of a physical sys-
tem. I say ‘at best’ because some interactionist dualists, such as W.
D. Hart, have postulated the existence of ‘psychic energy’, which is
convertible into physical energy in accordance with the conservation
laws.2 It w on’t do simply to object that energy is by definition a
physical quantity, as this threatens to turn the dispute into a purely
verbal one. In view of these and other limitations, it would serve
physicalists well if they could frame a more general argument
against interactionist dualism, which did not make specific appeal to
the conservation laws.3 Man y modern physicalists think that they
have an argument of just this sort to hand, in the form of the causal
closure argument.4
In fact, this is not so much a single argument as a family of argu-
ments. A ‘causal closure argument’, as I shall be interpreting that
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1See H. Bondi, Cosmology, 2nd edn (Cambridge University Press,
1961), Ch. XII. 
2See W. D. Hart, The Engines of the Soul (Cambridge University Press,
1988), Ch. 9.
3F or further discussion of the (ir)relevance of physical conservation
laws to the problem of psychophysical causation, see my Subjects of
Experience (Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 56–63. 
4 A r elatively early version of this form of argument may be found in
Christopher Peacocke, Holistic Explanation: Action, Space, Interpretation
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), pp. 134–43, though Peacocke’s version
does not exactly conform to the pattern I specify below. I raise an objec-
tion to Peacocke’s argument in my ‘Against an Argument for Token
Identity’, Mind 90 (1981), pp. 120–1.
phrase, has three premises: first, a physical causal closure principle;
second, the claim—to which interactionist dualists are themselves
committed—that at least some mental events are causes of physical
events; and third, the claim that the physical effects of mental caus-
es are not, in general, causally overdetermined.5 T he conclusion of
such an argument is that at least some mental events are identical
with physical events. Incidentally, I am assuming for the time being
that the relata of causal relations are events, broadly conceived to
include both processes and states, but not too much turns on this
assumption at the moment. Later on, however, I shall introduce a
distinction between event-causation and fact-causation which may
have a significant bearing on the issues under discussion.6
As we shall see shortly, physicalists espousing causal closure argu-
ments do not always agree on the way to formulate their causal clo-
sure principles. What is crucial to the success of such an argument
is that the causal closure principle appealed to should be neither too
strong nor too weak. If the principle is so strong, for instance, as to
render redundant the third premise of the argument—the non-
overdetermination claim—then the argument will become simply
question-begging, because it will amount to an argument from two
premises, one of which is accepted by the dualist, to a conclusion
which is not accepted by the dualist: and in these circumstances the
dualist may justly urge that his opponent is, in effect, merely assert-
ing what he is denying. Moreover, to have any persuasive force, the
causal closure principle must be one for which some measure of
empirical support can plausibly be mustered, and this places limits
on how strong it can be. On the other hand, the causal closure prin-
ciple must, obviously, not be so weak that the argument in which it
is deployed turns out to be invalid. What I shall try to show in this
paper is that it is in fact very difficult, if not impossible, for the
physicalist to formulate a causal closure principle which is neither
too strong nor too weak by these standards. In particular, I shall
argue that there are various forms of naturalistic dualism, of an
emergentist character, which are perfectly consistent with the
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5 W hy should systematic causal overdetermination be ruled out where
psychophysical causation is concerned? Perhaps it shouldn’t be, and this
would be a quick way to dispose of causal closure arguments: see further
Eugene Mills, ‘Interactionism and Ove rd e t e r m i n a t i o n’, A m e r i c a n
Philosophical Quarterly 33 (1996), pp. 105–17. But I take it that most inter-
actionist dualists would not wish to resort to this strategy if possible, as it
looks suspiciously ad hoc.
6 For more on the distinction between event-causation and fact-causa-
tion, see Jonathan Bennett, Events and their Names (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1988), pp. 21ff.
strongest physical causal closure principles that can plausibly be
advocated. If that is correct, then it means that causal closure argu-
ments against interactionist dualism do not, after all, provide a
superior alternative to the discredited arguments which appeal to
the conservation laws of physics.
I mentioned a moment ago the variety of causal closure principles
appealed to by physicalists. Let me briefly illustrate this variety by
some examples. In a recent paper, David Papineau appeals to the
following principle, which he calls the principle of ‘the complete-
ness of physics’:7
(1A) All physical effects have sufficient physical causes.
But in an earlier book, he appeals instead to a somewhat different
principle, which he calls by the same title, namely:8
(1B) All physical effects have complete physical causes.
Papineau explains that by ‘complete’ here he means ‘“complete” in
the sense that those causes on their own suffice by physical law to
fix the chances of those effects’. However, he does also advert to the
latter formulation in a footnote to the more recent paper, remarking
that ‘a stricter version ... would say that the chances of physical
effects are always fixed by sufficient physical causes’.9
In another recent contribution to the literature on causal closure,
Scott Sturgeon states what he too calls the principle of the com-
pleteness of physics as follows:10
(1C) Every physical effect has a fully revealing, purely physical
history.
However, Sturgeon himself glosses this in terms reminiscent of
Papineau’s, as meaning that ‘physical effects have their chances fully
determined by physical events alone’. In a paper commenting on
Sturgeon’s, Paul Noordhof seizes upon this gloss, remarking that it
‘seems more perspicuous’ than Sturgeon’s official formulation.11
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7 David Papineau, ‘Mind the Gap’, in J ames E. Tomberlin (ed.),
Philosophical Perspectives, 12: Language, Mind and Ontology (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1998), pp. 373–88: see p. 375.
8 David Papineau, Philosophical Naturalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993),
p. 22.
9 Papineau, ‘Mind the Gap’, p. 386, n. 4.
10 Scott Stur geon, ‘Physicalism and Overdetermination’, Mind 107
(1998), pp. 411–32: see p. 413.
1 1  Paul Noord h o f, ‘The Ove rdetermination Argument ve rsus the
Cause-and-Essence Principle—No Contest’, M i n d  108 (1999), pp.
367–75: see p. 367.
Accordingly, Noordhof advances the following as his own preferred
version of the causal closure principle:
(1D) Every physical effect has its chance fully determined by
physical events alone.
It is worth mentioning, however, that in a further gloss on his ver-
sion of the principle, Sturgeon asserts that ‘physics does not admit
that physical effects have non-physical causes’,12 and this suggests
yet another formulation, namely:
(1E) No physical effect has a non-physical cause.
Pretty clearly, principles (1A) to (1E) are not all equivalent to one
another, whatever one makes of the various glosses supplied by their
advocates. And these by no means exhaust the variety of formula-
tions to be found in the literature. One might have hoped for more
exactitude and agreement amongst physicalists when it comes to the
formulation of a principle so central to their position.
One thing we should notice immediately is that the last version
just cited, (1E), is too strong by the standards laid down earlier,
because it is bound to render redundant the non-overdetermination
premise of any causal closure argument in which it is deployed. To
see this clearly, let me now state explicitly what the remaining
premises and the conclusion of such an argument are supposed to
be. Obviously, these premises and the conclusion are themselves
susceptible to some variation in their formulation, but I shall utilize
what I hope can be agreed to be uncontentious versions of them.
The second premise, maintaining the existence of psychophysical
causation, may be stated thus:
(2) At least some mental events are causes of physical events.
The third premise, excluding the possibility of systematic causal
overdetermination, may be expressed as follows:
(3) The physical effects of mental causes are not, in general,
c a u s a l l y overdetermined. 
And the anti-dualist conclusion of the argument is supposed to be
this:
(4) At least some mental events are identical with physical events.
However, it is quite evident that (1E) and (2) together entail (4),
without the help of (3), so that (1E) can fairly be dismissed by the
interactionist dualist as question-begging—as I am sure it would be.
E. J. Lowe
574
12 Stur geon, ‘Physicalism and Overdetermination’, p. 413.
In what follows, I am not going to consider probabilistic versions
of the causal closure principle, such as (1D), because they introduce
complications which are not relevant to the main thrust of what I
have to say. Evidently, the chief reason why probabilistic versions
have some favour amongst physicalists is that they do not want it to
be objected against their argument that it presupposes a determin-
istic physics which is at odds with modern quantum theory. But
since many dualists and physicalists could agree that quantum-level
phenomena are quite probably irrelevant to the problem of psy-
chophysical causation, perhaps we can sidestep the complications
raised by probabilistic causation without unduly oversimplifying
the debate. It is true, of course, that some interactionist dualists,
such as Popper and Eccles, have maintained that quantum-level
phenomena are very much relevant to the problem of psychophysi-
cal causation, but they are an unrepresentative minority whom we
can perhaps afford to ignore for present purposes.13 And, after all,
if interactionist dualism can be rendered consistent with a deter-
ministic version of the causal closure principle that is not exces-
sively strong by the standards laid down earlier, it can hardly be
more problematic to render it consistent with a probabilistic ver-
sion. 
With this restriction in mind, let us look next at a version of the
causal closure principle which is very close to Papineau’s version
(1A) above, namely:
(1F) Every physical event which has a cause has a sufficient phys-
ical cause.
Here I should say that I understand a sufficient physical cause of a
given event to be a non-empty set of physical events, each of which
is a cause of the given event and all of which jointly causally neces-
sitate the occurrence of the given event. Note that I have included
the clause ‘which has a cause’ in (1F) to allow for the possibility of
uncaused physical events, such as, perhaps, a putative ‘first’ physi-
cal event like the so-called ‘Big Bang’. 
Now, the trouble with (1F) is that it is too weak by the standards
laid down earlier, because it does not serve to entail, when conjoined
with premises (2) and (3), the anti-dualist conclusion (4). This, in
brief, is because (1F) fails to take into account the transitivity of cau-
sation. To see this, suppose that a certain non-physical mental event
Mis a cause of a physical event P, such as a certain bodily move-
ment. But suppose also that M itself has a sufficient physical cause.
Then, clearly, Pmay hav e a sufficient physical cause, in accordance
Causal Closure Principles and Emer gentism
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13 See , e.g., John C. Eccles, The Evolution of the Brain: Creation of the
Self (London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 187–92.
with principle (1F), namely, a set of p hysical events wh i ch incl u d e s
the postulated sufficient physical cause of M. This is perfectly com-
p a t i ble with the non-ove rdetermination pre m i s e, (3), because when a
s u fficient physical cause of an event P causes P by means, inter alia,
o f causing an intervening event M w h i ch is in turn a cause of P, that
s u fficient cause and M do not thereby causally ove rdetermine P.
M o re generally, an interactionist dualist who espouses some ve rs i o n
o f e m e rgentism can happily endorse principle (1F). Such a dualist
may consistently maintain that the unive rse has evo l ved (without
‘outside’ influence by supernatural powe rs) from a condition in
wh i ch only physical events existed to one in wh i ch both physical and
mental events exist—the latter conceived as non-phy s i c a l — wh i l e
also espousing causal determinism for all eve n t s. On such a view, if
we trace back the causal history of e a ch mental event, we eve n t u a l l y
re a ch a time at wh i ch all of its causal antecedents we re wholly phy s-
ical eve n t s, because on this view it is the physical wh i ch has ulti-
mately brought the non-physical realm of the mental into being. A
little later on, I shall look in more detail at how psych o p hysical cau-
sation might operate in a dualistic wo rld go ve rned by principle (1F).
The physicalist needs, then, a causal closure principle which is
stronger that (1F). One likely candidate would be the following,
which seems to avoid the problem created by the transitivity of cau-
sation:14
(1G) At every time at which any physical event has a cause, it has
a sufficient physical cause.
With (1G) in place, it might seem, we cannot postulate that a phys-
ical event Phas a non-ph ysical cause M existing at a time t1 in addi-
tion to the sufficient physical cause which, according to (1G), must
exist at t1, without violating the non-overdetermination premise (3).
But in point of fact that is not so, because this neglects the possibil-
ity of simultaneous causation. Suppose that P occurs at t2 and that
the postulated sufficient physical cause of P which exists at t1 caus-
es P in part by means of causing M, which also exists at t1. In that
case, P is not causally overdetermined by M and the physical caus-
es of P that exist at t1. A situation of this sort is illustrated by the
following diagram, in which an arrow between events represents the
fact that the event at the tail of the arrow is an immediate cause of
the event at the head of the arrow:
E. J. Lowe
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14 (1G) is v ery near to a version of the causal closure principle advanced
Jaegwon Kim, namely, ‘Any physical event which has a cause at time t has
a physical cause at t’: see his S u p e r venience and Mind: Selected
Philosophical Essays (Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 280 and, for a
slightly different wording, p. 360.
P01 P02 t0
P11 P12 M t1
P t2
Fig. 1
In the situation depicted in Fig. 1, P has a sufficient physical cause
at time t1, namely, the set of physical events {P11, P12}. But P also has
as a cause at t1 the non-physical event M. P is not causally overde-
termined by {P11, P12} and M, because it is not the case that in the
absence of either one of them P would still have occurred. In par-
ticular, since P is caused by both P11 and P12, if {P11, P12} had been
absent, P would not have occurred. Equally, if M had been absent,
P would not have occurred, for want of a sufficient cause: for we are
supposing that {P11, P12} would not have been a sufficient cause of
P if P12 had not caused P in part by means of M. Of course, the
physicalist may well want to deny the possibility of simultaneous
causation, but it should be acknowledged that this is a further sub-
stantive claim, without which the causal closure principle (1G) can-
not be used to mount an attack on interactionist dualism.
H e re I pause to re m a rk that, in his own ve rsion of the causal cl o s u re
a rgument, Christopher Peacocke considers the possibility of a sce-
nario ve ry similar to the one depicted in Fig. 1, but contends that it is
a l re a dy ruled out by the prohibition on causal ove rd e t e r m i n a t i o n .1 5
This is what he says, replacing his labelling of e vents by my own:
Causal Closure Principles and Emer gentism
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1 5 See Peacock e, Holistic Explanat i o n, pp. 136–7. Peacock e ’s scenario dif-
fe rs from that of F i g. 1 in that, in his, P1 2 on its own is a sufficient cause of
P, but this diffe rence is irre l e vant for present purp o s e s. It must be observe d ,
h o we ve r, that Peacocke also makes the following assumption about P1 2 and P
( again replacing his labelling by mine): ‘[W]e have a complete and wh o l l y
p hysical account of ... the causal route from P1 2 to P in neurophy s i o l o g i c a l
terms [and] this account completely explains how the event P1 2 causes P’ (p.
134). Clearl y, this assumption is mu ch stronger than anything that can be
d e r ived from the causal cl o s u re principle (1G). Indeed, on the most natural
i n t e rp retation of P e a c o ck e ’s assumption it simply rules out by definition the
s o rt of situation depicted in Fig. 1, because in the latter there is a n o n- p hy s-
ical causal route from P1 2 to P in addition to a physical one. But then one
wo n d e rs why Peacocke bothered to discuss this sort of situation and object
to it on the grounds that it invo l ves ove rdetermination. 
Even if P12 causes M, and so it is true ... that if P12 had not
occurred, then M would not have occurred, the argument stands.
For still there is a causal route from M to P, one that evidently
cannot pass through P12 given the asymmetry of the causation
relation; and so overdetermination of P remains the case. The
fact that it is true that if P12 had not occurred, then M would not
have occurred, does not show that there is not overdetermination.
We can show this by considering another example. Your pressing
a button to light a bonfire electrically may be a signal to me to put
a lighted match to the bonfire at the same time; then it is true that
if you had not pressed the button, I would not have put the light-
ed match to the bonfire, but this cannot show that the resulting
fire was not overdetermined. 
However, it is not enough for Peacocke to establish, by means of
such an example, that ‘The fact that it is true that if P12 had not
occurred, then M would not have occurred, does not show that there
is not overdetermination’. Rather, it is incumbent upon him to
establish that in the envisaged psychophysical scenario there is
o ve rdetermination. Now, the bonfire example obviously d o e s
involve overdetermination, because your pressing the button would
have sufficed to light the bonfire even if it hadn’t caused me to light
it with a match. But in the situation depicted in Fig. 1, as I am inter-
preting it, {P11, P12} would not have sufficed to cause P if P12 had not
caused M.
Suppose one were to add to a causal closure argument invoking
the causal closure principle (1G) a further premise ruling out simul-
taneous causation: would (1G) be strong enough to deliver the anti-
dualist conclusion (4) in that case? The answer, as we shall see in
due course, is that it would not. But before we examine that issue,
let us consider whether (1G) is not already too strong by the stan-
dards laid down earlier. According to those standards, a causal clo-
sure principle should not be so strong that empirical support for it
cannot plausibly be mu s t e red. The weaker principle (1F) is cert a i n l y
not too strong by these standards, since it is empirically plausible to
suppose that the universe contained only physical events at an ear-
lier epoch and that latterday mental events are the ultimate effects
of causal chains traceable back to events occurring at that earlier
epoch. But when we consider that temporal ordering is dense, such
that between any two times there is another time, (1G) appears
unreasonably strong. Suppose that a physical event P, such as a
bodily movement, is known on good empirical grounds to have a
sufficient physical cause in a person’s brain at a time 100 millisec-
onds before the occurrence of P. And suppose it is further postu-
E. J. Lowe
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lated that that sufficient physical cause causes P in part by causing
an intermediate mental event M which occurs at a time 90 millisec-
onds before the occurrence of P. It cannot be illegitimate in princi-
ple to postulate something like this, given that temporal ordering is
dense, and empirical evidence could quite conceivably support the
claim that M occurred at the postulated time. However, principle
(1G) then requires us to suppose that there is a sufficient physical
cause of P existing at a time 90 milliseconds before the occurrence
of P, in advance of any empirical evidence in support of this sup-
position. That seems extravagant, especially when we consider that
(1G) imposes the same requirement with regard to any intervening
time between 100 and zero milliseconds before the occurrence of P.
Let me now return to the weaker causal closure principle (1F)
and consider how dualistic interaction might operate in a world gov-
erned by that principle. What I want to suggest is that, in such a
world, mental events might serve to render non-coincidental certain
physical events which, from a purely physical perspective, might
appear to occur by coincidence.16 F or present purposes (and sim-
plifying somewhat for ease of exposition), I take an event to be one
which ‘occurs by coincidence’ if its immediate causes are the ulti-
mate effects of independent causal chains. (One complication which
I shall sidestep is the question of what is to count as an ‘immediate
cause’ of a given event, to which different answers might be given
according to more or less fine-grained ways of individuating
events.) A classic example is this. A man walks to the well from his
house one day, following his usual route, but as he passes by a neigh-
bour’s house, a gust of wind dislodges a slate which falls on his
head, killing him. In this case, the man’s death occurred by coinci-
dence, because the causal chain leading to his being where he was
when the slate fell was independent of the causal chain leading to
the slate’s being where it was when the man passed by. We can eas-
ily imagine, however, another scenario in which the man’s death did
not occur by coincidence: for example, a scenario in which a trip-
wire installed by a jealous neighbour is touched by the approaching
man, dislodging the slate so that it falls just as he arrives beneath it. 
Changing now to an example involving psychophysical causation,
suppose that a physical event P—such as a bodily movement, or a
neural event which is a direct causal antecedent of such a bodily
movement—has as its immediate causes two physical events, P21 and
P22, occurring at a time t2, and that these physical events are the ulti-
Causal Closure Principles and Emer gentism
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16 I explor e this proposal in more detail and with a slightly different
focus in my ‘Self, Agency, and Mental Causation’, Journal of Consciousness
Studies 6 (1999), pp. 225–39.
mate effects of two distinct physical causal chains. From a purely
physical perspective, these chains might appear to be independent,
with the consequence that P might appear to occur by coincidence.
But the truth might be that a mental event M served to link those
two physical causal chains, rendering P non-coincidental—as is
depicted in the following diagram:
P01 P02 t0
P11 M P12 t1
P21 P22 t2
P t3
Fig. 2
In the situation depicted in Fig. 2, P has a sufficient physical cause
at times t0 and t2, namely, {P01, P02} and {P21, P22} respectively, but P
does not have a sufficient physical cause at time t1. This makes the
situation consistent with principle (1F), which requires only that a
physical event should have a sufficient physical cause at sometime at
which it has a cause, not at every time at which it has a cause—the
latter requirement only being imposed by the stronger principle
(1G). 
In a world containing the situation depicted in Fig. 2, a physical
scientist might be able to discover all the physical events depicted
there, correctly identify each of them as a cause of P, and correctly
claim that certain combinations of them are sufficient causes of P.
In a sense, he would be in possession of a complete physical expla-
nation of the occurrence of P, for he would have an explanation
which correctly identifies all of P’s physical causes up to a certain
time before the occurrence of P and a time (in fact, more than one
time) at which a subset of those causes is wholly sufficient for P.
And yet, because the mental event M would be, as it were, invisible
to him as a purely physical scientist, his explanation would be, in
E. J. Lowe
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another sense, incomplete and would falsely represent the occur-
rence of P as being coincidental. My suggestion is that the world of
Fig. 2 may in fact be our world. If it is our world, physical science
can present us with the semblance of a complete explanation of our
bodily movements, and yet it will be an explanation which leaves
something out, giving our bodily movements the appearance of
being coincidental events arising from independent causal chains of
events in our brains and nervous systems. But isn’t that precisely
what current physical science does appear to do? As it traces back the
p hysical causes of our bodily movements into the maze of
antecedent neural events, it seems to lose sight of any unifying fac-
tor explaining why those apparently independent causal chains of
neural events should have converged upon the bodily movements in
question. In short, it leaves us with a kind of ‘binding’ problem, not
unlike the ‘binding’ problem associated with conscious perceptual
experience (the problem of explaining how widely distributed and
apparently unrelated neural events in the cortex can support the
existence of unified perceptual experiences).17
What I want to show next is that the relatively weak physical
causal closure principle (1F) is far from being the strongest such
principle that is compatible with dualistic interactionism. In fact,
dualistic interactionism is even consistent with a causal closure
principle that is stronger in some ways than principle (1G), the
strongest principle that we have examined so far, apart from the
question-begging principle (1E). The principle I have in mind is
the following:18
(1H) Every physical event contains only other physical events in
its transitive causal closure.
By the ‘transitive causal closure’ of an event P, I mean the set of
events consisting of the immediate causes of P, the immediate caus-
Causal Closure Principles and Emer gentism
581
17 F or a description of the more familiar ‘binding’ problem, see Valerie
Gray Hard c a s t l e, ‘Psych o l o gy ’s Binding Problem and Possibl e
Neurobiological Solutions’, Journal of Consciousness Studies 1 (1994), pp .
66–90.
18 Something like (IH) is suggested by the following recent remark of
Jaegwon Kim’s: ‘One way of stating the principle of physical causal clo-
sure is this: If you pick any physical event and trace out its causal ancestry
or posterity, that will never take you outside the physical domain. That is,
no causal chain will ever cross the boundary between the physical and the
nonphysical’. See Jaegwon Kim, Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the
Mind-Body Problem and Mental Causation (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
1998), p. 40. Of course, another reading of this remark might equate it
with the excessively strong principle (1E).
es of those causes, the immediate causes of those causes ... and so on:
in short, the set which includes every event which stands in the
ancestral of the ‘immediate cause’ relation to P. The implication of
(1H), then, is that the immediate causes of all physical events are
always and only other physical events. Principle (1H) clearly pro-
hibits the situations depicted earlier in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 (remem-
bering that an arrow between events depicted there signifies imme-
diate causation). Indeed, there is a clear sense in which principle
(1H) is stronger than principle (1G)—even when the latter is sup-
plemented by a prohibition on simultaneous causation—though it is
true that (1H) is weaker in that it does not imply that any physical
event has a sufficient physical cause. However, in this respect (1H)
has an empirical advantage over (1G), inasmuch as it is compatible
with the claim, which is plausible in the light of quantum mechan-
ics, that at least some physical causation is irreducibly probabilistic.
How could dualistic interaction be compatible with principle
(1H)? For the following reason. It could conceivably be the case
that, even though (1H) is true, sometimes a non-physical mental
event M causes it to be the case that certain physical events, P1, P2,
... Pn, have a certain physical effect, P.
19W hat this would involve is
the causation by a mental event of a physical causal fact. So I am
assuming now a distinction between event-causation and fact-cau-
sation. In a case of fact-causation, what is brought about is not an
event, but a fact or state of affairs. Some facts are causal facts, such
as the fact that certain physical events, P1, P2, ... Pn, are causes of
another physical event, P. There is no reason in principle why such
a causal fact should not have a causal explanation and, indeed, there
may be a positive reason for seeking such an explanation, as I shall
explain later. Now, if a mental event M causes it to be the case that
certain physical events, P1, P2, ... Pn, have a certain physical effect,
P, then, it seems clear, M is itself a cause of P—but not an imme-
diate cause of P, nor an immediate cause of any of the physical
events P1, P2, ... Pn. In fact, it seems clear that M is not included in
P’s transitive causal closure and hence that M can be non-physical
without violating principle (1H).
There is nothing unintelligible in principle about the notion of a
mental event causing a physical causal fact, as the following theo-
logical example shows. Suppose that principle (1H) is true in a
E. J. Lowe
582
19 F or an earlier development of this conception of mental causation,
see my Subjects of Experience, pp. 64–71 and 82ff. There are some resem-
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world in which every physical event has a sufficient physical cause
and no physical causation is either simultaneous or backward. Such
a world can have no beginning in time, because it can have no first
physical event. (Suppose it did have a first physical event. By
hypothesis, that event would have a sufficient physical cause, which
would have to be an earlier physical event or conjunction of such
events, contradicting the supposition just made.) And yet we could
still ask of this world why it should exist or be actual rather than any
other. One intelligible answer would be to say that this world was
actual because God had chosen it to be actual. God’s choice, then,
would have caused it to be the case that a world containing certain
physical causal facts was actual—and this would be mental causation
of physical causal facts.
What is envisaged here, it must be emphasised, is not God’s caus-
ing certain initial physical events, which then go on to cause other
physical events in accordance with causal laws chosen by God— for
in the envisaged world there are no ‘initial’ physical events, as the
world has no beginning in time. Now, of course, it may be asked
when God’s choice was made. If it was made at any time, it would
seemingly have to have been made earlier than the occurrence of
any physical event. That is not impossible, however, since a physi-
cal world which has no beginning in time—no first physical event—
need not have a past of infinite duration, any more than a line of
finite length need have a first or last point. On the other hand, if
God’s choice was not made at any time, because He is conceived to
be eternal or timeless, then it is true we cannot say that His choice
was an event—but that in no way detracts from the fact that the
example demonstrates the intelligibility of mental causation of
physical causal facts.
But how could anything like this model of mental causation be
envisaged as applying in cases of ordinary human behaviour? How,
for instance, could a mental event, such as a choice of mine, cause it
to be the case that certain physical events in my brain cause a cer-
tain bodily movement of mine? But what is being requested here? If
what is being requested is a demonstration that causation of this
kind—the causation of a physical causal fact by a mental event—is
intelligible, then we have already provided it by means of the fore-
going theological example. If, on the other hand, what is being
requested is some account of the ‘mechanism’ that would be
involved in such causation, in the human case, then it may be
protested that the request is perhaps unreasonable—first of all
because the term ‘mechanism’ is suggestive of purely physical cau-
sation, which is precisely not being envisaged here, and secondly
because supplying more detail about the possible nature of such
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causation in the human case may not properly be a matter for arm-
chair philosophical speculation. My aim has only been to show that
dualistic interactionism is compatible with a surprisingly strong
form of physical causal closure principle, not to help the would-be
interactionist to construct a detailed model of psychophysical
causation. 
This reply may seem unduly evasive. Is it not an unacceptable
implication of the proposed form of mental causation that the mind
would have to have the power to affect physical causal laws? Not
necessarily, for we need not assume that all causal relations between
physical events are subsumable under laws.20 There may be irre-
ducibly singular causation between physical events, in which case a
mental event could cause a physical causal fact without necessarily
causing a change in physical laws. But if the real thought behind the
objection is that mental causation of the kind envisaged would
somehow inevitably conflict with the conservation laws of physics,
then I can only say, first, that the burden of proof in this matter lies
with my opponent and, second, that if, after all, the physicalist must
fall back on an appeal to the conservation laws in an attempt to
defeat the dualist, then all the apparent advantages of appealing to
causal closure principles have fallen away and we have returned to
the tired old debate of earlier times.
But why, it may be asked, should we feel any need to invoke men-
tal causation of the kind just proposed? The answer, once again,
might be that only by invoking such mental causation could we rep-
resent the physical effect of certain physical causes—such as a bod-
ily movement produced by a large number of apparently indepen-
dent neural events in the brain—as being non-coincidental, since
there might be no identifiable physical event(s) which could be seen
to link the chains of physical causation involved in an appropriate
way. At the same time, there might be strong empirical evidence
that a mentalev ent was playing precisely such a role, and a strong
intuition that the bodily movement in question was not an event
which occurred ‘by coincidence’. All of this would be perfectly
compatible with a naturalistic form of emergentism, moreover,
since we could still suppose that every mental event ultimately has
a sufficient physical cause. Of course, a physicalist might object that
if empirical evidence did confirm that a mental event was playing
the kind of causal role now being mooted, we would have to con-
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clude that this event was identical with some physical event, almost
certainly some neural event in the brain. But why would we have to
conclude this, in the absence of any direct empirical evidence for the
existence of such a physical event? What I have been trying to show
in this paper is that causal closure arguments do not provide the
kind of justification for such a claim that physicalists may fondly
think they do.21
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